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STATUTORY BARS TO DUAL SOVEREIGN PROSECUTIONS:
THE MINNESOTA AND NORTH DAKOTA APPROACHES
COMPARED
MIcHAEL J. HAGBURG*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the foundation stones on which American law is built is the
idea that a person should not be subjected to multiple prosecutions for
the same offense.' This idea is embodied in the Federal Constitution and
the constitutions of most of the states.2 The United States Supreme
Court, however, has long held that while multiple prosecutions are gener-
ally proscribed, it is constitutional for different sovereigns to subject a
person to multiple prosecutions for the same act. 3 Such prosecutions are
constitutional because the accused person, through the commission of a
single act, committed an offense against two sovereigns.4
This exception to the prohibition against double jeopardy is called
the dual sovereign doctrine. This doctrine long existed as a mere philo-
sophical concept, and was not used to permit multiple prosecutions until
the 1920s. 5 In the past thirty-five years, however, the doctrine has often
been used to allow multiple prosecutions.6 As the reach of federal crim-
* Associate, Smith, Bakke, Hovland & Oppegard, P.C., Bismarck, N.D.; Law Clerk, North Da-
kota Supreme Court, 1995-96; B.A., University of Minnesota, 1985; J.D., University of North Dakota
School of Law, 1995.
1. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). The Court in Green observed that:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system
of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty.
Id.
2. See infra notes 1.1-21 and accompanying text (discussing federal and state double jeopardy
prohibitions).
3. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (discussing the basic tenets of the dual sovereign
doctrine).
4. Id.
5. See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text (discussing the early history of the dual sov-
ereign doctrine).
6. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (discussing the recent history of the dual sov-
ereign doctrine). See also United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (allowing federal
prosecution following state acquittal in the case of the police officers accused of beating Rodney
King), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996); United States v. Kummer,
15 F.3d 1455, 1461 (8th Cir. 1994) (allowing federal prosecution of accused North Dakota drug dealer
following Overturn of state conviction).
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inal law expands, and the overlap between federal and state law grows,
the use of the dual sovereign doctrine will inevitably expand. 7
The reach of the dual sovereign doctrine, however, is not unlimited. 8
Nearly half the states have imposed some sort of statutory control on
dual sovereign prosecutions.9 This study will focus on the history and
interpretation of the statutory bars to dual sovereign prosecutions in
Minnesota and North Dakota. The Minnesota and North Dakota statutes
have very similar roots, but have developed in different ways.lO This
study will analyze this development with an eye toward determining the
current scope and reach of the statutes.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause protects persons
from being subjected to multiple prosecutions for the same offense.ll
The prohibition exists to shield the individual from the raw power of the
state. 12 The Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce1 3 stated that the
prohibition against double jeopardy "consist[s] of three separate consti-
tutional protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple pun-
ishments for the same offense."14
The Court has struggled to define "same offense" in the double
jeopardy context. In United States v. Dixon,15 the Court indicated that
the appropriate test of whether a prosecution is for the "same offense"
is the "same elements" test.16 This test was first enunciated in Block-
burger v. United States.17 In applying the Blockburger test, a court must
compare the statutory provisions at issue and ask "whether each provi-
sion requires proof of a fact which the other does not."18
7. See Andrew Blum, Fighting Crime With a 'Kitchen Sink': Critics Say Federal Bill Promises
More Than It Can Deliver and Offers Few Real Solutions, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 7, 1994, at Al, A26
(discussing the increase in federal crimes under the 1994 crime bill and critics' claims that this will
lead to increased and duplicative federal prosecutions).
8. See infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text (discussing barriers to the application of the dual
sovereign doctrine).
9. See infra note 59 (listing state statutes limiting dual sovereign prosecutions).
10. See infra part I (discussing the history of the Minnesota and North Dakota statutes).
11. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The clause specifically provides that "nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " Id.
12. See supra note I (stating the philosophical basis of the prohibition against double jeopardy).
13. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
14. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,717 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
15. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
16. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849.2856 (1993). In Dixon, the Court rejected the "same
conduct" test enunciated in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990). Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2864.
17. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
18. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,304 (1932).
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The Supreme Court extended the Federal Constitution's prohibition
against double jeopardy to the states in 1969.19 Most states, however,
had imposed constitutional protections against double jeopardy long
before the Court finally incorporated the federal double jeopardy bar.20
Some states, including North Dakota, had both constitutional and statu-
tory prohibitions against double jeopardy embodied in their law.2 1
The dual sovereign doctrine embodies an exception to the Federal
Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy. 22 Under the doc-
trine, multiple prosecution of a person under separate statutes requiring
proof of the same elements is constitutional if the statutes are promul-
gated by discrete sovereigns.23 For example, if a person accused of bank
robbery was tried and acquitted in federal court, she could still face trial
on bank robbery charges in state court, based on the identical acts and
evidence.24 The second prosecution would be constitutional because the
person's single act was an offense to two separate sovereigns. 25
19. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). The Benton Court stated that "the double
jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional
heritage, and ... it should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
20. JAY A. SIOLER., Doutl JEoPARDY: THE DEvELoPMENT OF A LEAL ANDSotAL POuCY 78-79
(1969). Sigler indicated that only five states did not have "a constitutional provision against a second
trial for the same offense" in 1969. Id. (footnote omitted). Those states were Connecticut, Maryland,
Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont. Id. at 79 n.6.
21. See ND. CONST. art. I, § 12 (providing that "[n]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-07 (1993) (providing that:
[n]o person can be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, nor can any person be
subjected to a second prosecution for a public offense for which he has once been
prosecuted and convicted, or acquitted, or put in jeopardy, except as is provided by law
for new trials).
The following statutes also impose similar broad restrictions against multiple prosecutions: ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-116 (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE § 687 (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-7
(Harrison 1994); IDAHO CODE § 19-107 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/3-4 (Smith-Hurd
1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 816.1 (West 1994); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 591 (West 1981); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 263, § 7 (West 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-11-31 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §
46-11-503 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.391 (Michie 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-10
(Michie 1994); N.Y. C Ram. PROc. LAW § 40.20 (McKinney 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 14 (West
1992); 18 PA.CONS.STAT. ANN. § 109 (1983); PR.LAWS ANN. tit. 34, § 6 (1991); TEx. CODECRiM.
PRoc. ANN. art. 1.10 (West 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-6 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-292
(Michie 1995); W.VA. CODE § 61-11-13 (1992).
22. See Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852) (advancing the principle that the Fifth
Amendment's double jeopardy bar does not forbid successive prosecutions by different sovereigns
based on the same act).
23. Id. The Court in Moore observed that:
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said
to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of
the laws of either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both.
Id. at 19.
24. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (upholding bank robber's state court conviction
that followed a federal court acquittal on bank robbery charges).
25. Id.
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The legal theory supporting the dual sovereign doctrine has a long
history.26 In the early 1800s, the Supreme Court thought that state laws
extending into areas already within the scope of federal law were inval-
id.27 In Fox v. Ohio,28 however, the Court abandoned this view, finding a
state law that overlapped a federal law enforceable. 29 The Court, in Fox,
admitted that its decision could lead to successive prosecutions based on
the same act; and, it opined that such prosecutions would be constitution-
al. 30 In United States v. Marigold,31 the Court read this dicta to be the
holding of Fox.32 The door was thus open to expansive development of
what was to become the dual sovereign doctrine. 33
It was not until the 1920s that the dual sovereign doctrine was
applied to allow a successive prosecution by a second sovereign. 34 In
United States v. Lanza,35 the Court allowed the federal government to
prosecute a group of defendants under the National Prohibition Act even
though these defendants had been previously convicted, based on the
same conduct, of violating state liquor laws. 36 The Court in Lanza,
26. See J. A. C. Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation: Common Law and British
Empire Comparisons, 4 UCLA L. Rav. 1, 1-8 (1956) (discussing the early history of the dual sovereign
doctrine).
27. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 21-23 (1820). Justice Washington, writing for the
Moore Court, commented that "[t]o subject [the people] to the operation of two laws upon the same
subject, dictated by distinct wills, particularly in a case inflicting pains and penalties, is, to my
apprehension, something very much like oppression ... ." Id. at 23.
28. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
29. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410,435 (1847). The Fox Court upheld an Ohio law punishing
distributors of counterfeit coins. Id. The law had been challenged as repugnant to federal law. Id. at
432.
30. Id. at 435. The Fox Court indicated that the government's "benignant spirit" would prevent
offenders from being punished by both state and federal governments for the same act. Id. The Court
stated, however, that it would be constitutional to mete out such successive punishments. Id.
31. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850).
32. United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560,569-70 (1850). The Marigold Court inter-
preted Fox to have held "that the same act might.. . constitute an offence against both the State and
Federal governments, and might draw to its commission the penalties denounced by either .... " Id.
33. Grant, supra note 26, at 1 n.l. For example, the Court in Moore v. Illinois stated that it would
not be a violation of the Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy to inflict multiple punish-
ments based on the same act. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 19 (1852). The Moore Court commented that, if
an offender is punished by a state and the federal government based on the same act, "it cannot be
truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act
he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable." Id. The Court held con-
sistently to this view until the early twentieth century, even though the doctrine was never invoked
during this period to actually allow a successive prosecution by a second sovereign. See Michael A.
Dawson, Note, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE
L. 281, 291-92 (1992) (discussing the history of the dual sovereign doctrine).
34. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 385 (1922) (allowing prosecution under the Na-
tional Prohibition Act following defendants' conviction under state liquor laws).
35. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
36. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 385 (1922). The defendants were convicted under
Washington law of illegally manufacturing, transporting, and possessing liquor. Id. at 379. They were
then indicted under the National Prohibition Act for illegally manufacturing, transporting, and posses-
sing the same liquor, and for having a still and still paraphernalia. Id. at 378-79. The district court
dismissed five counts of the indictment based on defendant's special plea. Id.
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relying on a line of decisions dating back to Fox, found that "an act
denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an
offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by
each." 37 This interpretation by the Court of the dual sovereign doctrine
was applied in a series of cases, 38 but the doctrine seemed on the verge of
extinction by the mid-1950s.39
In 1959, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and revived the dual sover-
eign doctrine.40 In Bartkus v. Illinois,41 the Court found that neither the
Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy prohibition nor the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause barred a state bank robbery prosecu-
tion of a defendant who had been previously acquitted in federal court
on charges based on the same acts. 42 In Abbate v. United States,43 de-
cided the same day as Bartkus, the Court found that the federal double
37. Id. at 382. The Court in Lanza, while reaffirming the dual sovereign doctrine, seemed to
hedge a bit in dealing with the interplay between the doctrine and the Fifth Amendment's double
jeopardy bar. Id. The Court stated that the second prosecution at issue was valid under the Fifth
Amendment be-cause the double jeopardy bar applied only to the federal government, and thus only
forbade a second prosecution following a prior federal prosecution. Id.
38. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943);
Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937); Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927); Hebert
v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
39. See Grant, supra note 26, at 6-7 (discussing the "increasing hesitancy on the part of the Court
to sustain overlapping laws"). In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, for example, the Court upheld a Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court ruling that the Pennsylvania Sedition Act was superseded by the federal Smith Act.
350 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1956). The Court did not reach the question of "whether double or multiple
punishment for the same overt acts ... has constitutional sanction." Id. at 509. It commented, how-
ever, that "[w]ithout compelling indication to the contrary, we will not assume that Congress intended
to permit the possibility of double punishment." Id. at 509-10.
40. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (upholding federal conviction following
state court conviction); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (upholding state court conviction fol-
lowing federal acquittal).
41. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
42. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). Bartkus was tried and acquitted in federal district
court on bank robbery charges. Id. at 122. He was then tried and convicted on similar charges in
state court and sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, indicated
that since it was well settled that the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy provisions did not apply to the
states, any challenge to a state prosecution following a federal prosecution must rest on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 124. Relying on Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847),
and its progeny, the Court found the Due Process Clause did not bar a second trial following a prior
trial by a different sovereign based on the same acts. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 136. Bartkus was a 5-4
decision. Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, dissented. Id. at 150.
Justice Brennan, likewise joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, also dissented. Id. at
164. Justice Black's arguments were relied on by the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and New
Hampshire, which chose not to follow Bartkus. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (discus-
sing state court responses to the dual sovereign doctrine). Justice Black argued that:
If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two "Sovereigns" to inflict it
than for one. If danger to the innocent is emphasized, that danger is surely no less when
the power of State and Federal Governments is brought to bear on one man in two trials,
than when one of these "Sovereigns" proceeds alone. In each case, inescapably, a man
is forced to face danger twice for the same conduct.
Bartkus, 359 U.S at 155 (Black, J., dissenting).
43. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
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jeopardy bar did not prohibit a federal conspiracy prosecution of a de-
fendant convicted in state court on charges based on the same acts.44 In
the years since 1959, the Court has consistently applied the dual sover-
eign doctrine to allow successive prosecutions. 45 In Heath v. Alabama,46
for example, the Court affirmed a new application of the doctrine,
finding no bar to a state murder prosecution that followed another
state's conviction of the same defendant for the same murder.47
A number of mechanisms exist to limit wholesale application of the
dual sovereign doctrine. 48 The federal government's ability to conduct
successive prosecutions under the dual sovereign doctrine is limited by
the Petite policy. 49 This policy is aimed at limiting federal prosecutions
44. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196 (1959). The defendants in Abbate had conspired
to destroy telephone facilities and pled guilty in state court to conspiring to injure the property of
another. Id. at 188. Based on the same acts, they were then indicted in federal court on charges of
conspiracy to destroy communications facilities. Id. at 188-89. They were convicted in federal court,
but appealed claiming a violation of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy prohibition. Id. at 189.
The Court observed that the decision in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922), had firmly
established the principle that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to federal prosecutions subsequent to
state prosecutions based on the same acts. Abbate, 359 U.S. at 194. The Court indicated that this
principle had been accepted "without question" since Lanza and therefore concluded that the
defendants' prior state convictions did not bar subsequent federal prosecution. Id. at 194-96.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978) (allowing federal prosecution
subsequent to tribal court conviction of same person based on same incident). The vitality of the dual
sovereign doctrine has not always been certain. In the early 1960s, it seemed to be in decline. See
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 215 (1960) (rejecting dual sovereign doctrine arguments and
denying admission of evidence obtained by state authorities in a search that would have been a
violation of the Fourth Amendment had it been conducted by federal authorities). The Court in Elkins
commented that "[t]o the victim it matters not whether his constitutional right has been invaded by a
federal agent or by a state officer." Id. (footnote omitted). See also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964) (rejecting dual sovereign doctrine arguments and holding that "privilege
against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal law as well as
state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal law"); Note,
Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise in Federalism, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 1538, 1544-49 (1967) (arguing that Elkins and Murphy were representative of the "erosion" of
the dual sovereign doctrine).
46. 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
47. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985). Heath had hired a pair of hit men to kill his wife. Id.
at 83. The hiring took place in Alabama and the murder itself took place in Georgia. Id. at 83-84.
Heath pled guilty to a murder charge in Georgia, and was then indicted on another murder charge in
Alabama. Id. at 84-85. He argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the second prosecution.
Id. at 85. The Supreme Court, ruling for the first time on whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred
successive prosecutions by two states based on the same conduct, found that the second prosecution
was not barred. Id. at 93-94. The court based its opinion on the dual sovereign doctrine. Id. at 88.
48. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138 (1959) (discussing state statutory bars on successive
prosecutions). The Court in Bartkus indicated that the state and federal legislatures were in the best
position to determine how to deal with the issue of successive prosecutions by different sovereigns and
that the Court "ought not to utilize the Fourteenth Amendment to interfere with this development." Id.
at 138-39.
49. UNrrED STATES ArroRsNys' MANUAL § 9-2.142 (1992). Attorney General William P. Rogers
announced the Justice Department's policy against dual or successive prosecutions on April 6, 1959.
Delay v. United States, 602 F.2d 173, 176 (8th Cir. 1979). The policy takes its name from Petite v.
United States, 361 U.S. 529, 529-30 (1960) (per curiam), a case in which federal prosecutors indicted
and convicted the same defendant on conspiracy charges in two separate federal district courts. The
offenses for which Petite was convicted arose out of the same transaction. Id. at 530. The govern
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subsequent to prior state or federal prosecutions "based on substantially
the same act, acts or transaction ... ."50 Subsequent prosecutions are al-
lowed only if "there is a compelling federal interest supporting the dual
or successive federal prosecution." 5 1 The policy, however, is not
"constitutionally mandated." 52 Criminal defendants thus have no right
to the Petite policy's protection unless the government chooses to
invoke it.53
Several state courts have rejected the dual sovereign theory. In
Pennsylvania, the supreme court has forbidden successive prosecutions
based on the same transaction except when shown "that the interests of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the jurisdiction which initially
prosecuted and imposed punishment are substantially different."54 The
Michigan Supreme Court interpreted the Michigan Constitution55 to re-
quire imposition of a similar rule against successive prosecutions. 56 In
ment moved to vacate the second conviction based on its policy "that several offenses arising out of a
single transaction should be alleged and tried together and should not be made the basis of multiple
prosecutions." Id. The Court granted the motion without offering any "opinion on the question of
double jeopardy." Id. at 531.
50. UNnraD STATES ATrONEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.142(A).
51. Id. The decision on whether a "compelling federal interest" exists is left up to "the appropri-
ate Assistant Attorney General." Id. Federal prosecutors must obtain authorization from this person
prior to "initiating or continuing" a successive prosecution. Id.
52. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 (1977) (per curiam).
53. Id. at 31. The Rinaldi Court observed that: "The overriding purpose of the Petite policy is to
protect the individual from any unfairness associated with needless multiple prosecutions. The de-
fendant, therefore, should receive the benefit of the policy whenever its application is urged by the
Government." Id. (footnote omitted). See also Delay, 602 F.2d at 178 (holding "that a criminal de-
fendant has no rights under the internal policy of the Justice Department to limit dual federal-state pro-
secutions").
54. Commonwealth v. Mills, 286 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. 1971) (footnote omitted). Mills involved a
defendant who had pled guilty to federal bank robbery charges and was then convicted on state
charges arising out of the same transaction. Id. at 639. He challenged the state conviction as double
jeopardy. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the dual sovereign doctrine and granted
that it was valid. Id. at 640. Nonetheless, it criticized the doctrine for focusing on the interests of the
state and federal governments rather than the individual. Id. at 641. Relying in part on Justice Black's
dissent in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959), the court announced that it would allow
successive prosecutions only when "substantially different" sovereign interests could be shown. Mills,
286 A.2d at 642. The court found that the case at issue did not meet its test and vacated the state con-
viction. Id.
55. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15. In pertinent part, this section provides that "[n]o person shall be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy." Id.
56. People v. Cooper, 247 N.W.2d 866,'870 (Mich. 1976). Cooper was acquitted on bank rob-
bery charges in federal court, but subsequently convicted in state court on charges stemming from the
same transaction. Id. at 867. The court read article one, section 15 of the Michigan Constitution to
forbid such a successive prosecution. Id. at 870. It adopted the approach of the court in Mills, ruling
that the state constitution "prohibits a second prosecution for an offense arising out of the same
criminal act unless it appears from the record that the interests of the State of Michigan and the
jurisdiction which initially prosecuted are substantially different." Id. The court observed that this
rule was to be applied on a case-by-case basis. Id. Analyzing Cooper's case in light of this rule, it
reversed his conviction. Id. at 871.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 72:583
New Hampshire, the supreme court went even further, ruling that the
state constitution57 barred second prosecutions by different sovereigns. 58
State legislatures, however, have been far more active than state
courts in challenging the dual sovereign doctrine. Statutes restricting the
application of the doctrine are in place in twenty-four states.59 These
statutes fall generally into two groups: statutes which bar successive
prosecution based on the same offense 60 and those which bar successive
prosecution based on the same act.61 The remainder of this study will be
devoted to analyzing the statutory bars to successive prosecutions by dif-
ferent sovereigns. This analysis will focus on the statutory schemes in
57. N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 16. This provision provides that "[n]o subject shall be liable to be tried,
after an acquittal, for the same crime or offense." Id.
58. State v. Hogg, 385 A.2d 844 (N.H. 1978). Hogg involved defendants who were acquitted on
bank robbery charges in federal court, but then indicted on state charges stemming from the same
transaction. Id. at 844. The court quickly found that Bartkus, 359 U.S. 121, was not binding on its in-
terpretation of the state constitution. Hogg, 385 A.2d at 845. The court then stated its belief that the
underlying basis of the double jeopardy protections in the federal and state constitutions was protection
of the individual from repeat punishment. Id. The court observed that "[it is fundamentally and mor-
ally wrong to try a man for a crime of which he has already been tried and found not guilty." Id. The
court also noted that Justice Black expressed a similar view in his dissent to Bartkus. Id. at 846. The
court thus held that successive prosecutions by different sovereigns were barred by part one, article
16 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Hogg, 385 A.2d at 847. Analyzing the charges at issue, the
court stated that "[i]t is pure fiction to say that they are different crimes because of dual sovereignty"
and thereby sustained defendants' exceptions. Id. at 846-47.
59. ALA. CODE § 15-3-8 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 12.20.010 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-114
(Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 793 (West 1985); DEt.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 209 (1995); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-1-8 (Harrison 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-112 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 19-315 (1987); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/3-4 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-5 (Bums 1994); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 505.050 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.045 (West 1987);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-11-27 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-504 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
171.070 (Michie 1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:l-1I1 (West 1995); N.Y. C im. PRoc. LAW § 40.20 (Mc-
Kinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-03-13 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 130 (West 1992); 18
PA.CoNS.STAT. ANN. § 111 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-404 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294
(1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.43.040 (West 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.71 (West 1996).
60. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-114 (Michie 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 209 (1995); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 701-112 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.045 (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-11-27
(1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:l-ll (West 1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 111 (1983); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 939.71 (West 1996).
61. ALA. CODE § 15-3-8 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 12.20.010 (1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 793 (West
1985); IDAHO CODE § 19-315 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-5 (Bums 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §
46-11-504 (1995); NEV. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 171.070 (Michie 1992); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20
(McKinney 1992); N.D. CENr. CODE § 29-03-13 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 130 (West 1992);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-404 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294 (1995); WASH. RaV. CODE ANN. §
10.43.040 (West 1990).
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place in Minnesota62 and North Dakota, 63 which are representative of the
two different statutory approaches noted above.
III. STATUTORY HISTORY
Both the Minnesota and North Dakota statutes barring successive
prosecutions by different sovereigns have their origins in the 19th cen-
tury codification movement. 64 Both can also be traced back to the indi-
vidual most identified with this movement, David Dudley Field.65 Field
was the guiding force behind New York's law reform commissions, 66
which drafted a Code of Civil Procedure, a Code of Criminal Procedure,
a Political Code, a Penal Code, and a Civil Code.67 With the exception of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the codes were not enthusiastically accepted
62. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.045 (West 1987). This section provides:
If an act or omission in this state constitutes a crime under both the laws of this state and
the laws of another jurisdiction, a conviction or acquittal of the crime in the other juris-
diction shall not bar prosecution for the crime in this state unless the elements of both law
and fact are identical.
Id.
63. N.D. CENr. CODE § 29-03-13 (1991). This section provides: "When an act charged as a pub-
lic offense is within the jurisdiction of another state, country, or territory as well as in this state, a con-
viction or acquittal thereof in the former is a bar to a prosecution or indictment therefor in this state."
Id.
64. See infra notes 70-84 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of the North Dakota and
Minnesota statutes). The ideas of Jeremy Bentham are widely seen as providing the philosophical
basis for the codification movement. See William B. Fisch, Civil Code: Notes for an Uncelebrated
Centennial, 43 N.D. L. REy. 485, 487-94 (1967) (discussing the 19th century codification movement
and Bentham's influence on it). Bentham believed that the law should be written by legislators rather
than propounded on a case-by-case basis by judges. Id. at 490-92. Bentham helped bring the idea of
"law reform through codification" to the United States through correspondence in the early 1800s with
President James Madison and each of the nation's state governors. CARLEs M. COOK,THE AMERICAN
CODIFICATION MovEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REroaRM 97-101 (1981). Partly as a result of
Bentham's efforts, "law reform would remain a preoccupation of the legal profession" in the United
States from the 1820s through the 1850s. Id. at 69.
65. See infra notes 70-84 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of the North Dakota and
Minnesota statutes). Field was among the most influential law reformers of his day because of "his
relentless ... promotion of codification throughout most of his professional career." Cook, supra note
64, at 188. His involvement with the actual formation of draft codes was one factor that made him
unique among his peers. Id.
66. See DAUN VAN EE, DAviD DuDLEY FiELD AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW 34-45 (1986)
(discussing Field's paramount role in New York's law reform process). New York's 1846 Constitu-
tion called for the reduction of the law of the state to a written code. Fisch, supra note 64, at 497. The
constitution called for the creation of a commission to accomplish this task. Id. Field was not among
the original commissioners, but was appointed to the commission on practice and pleading in 1847.
vAN EE, supra, at 34. His appointment "revitalized" the commission and the commission completed a
draft Code of Procedure in 1848. Id. at 35.
67. See vAN EE, supra note 66, at 39-51 (discussing the commission's codification work). The
final Code of Civil Procedure was completed in 1850, as was the Code of Criminal Procedure. Id. at
44. At the same time, however, the commission which had been given the task of reforming the sub-
stantive law of New York lost its authorization. Fisch, supra note 64, at 497. Field's "constant agita-
tion" led to the commission's revival in 1857. Id. With Field as chairman, the commission completed
the Political Code in 1860, the Penal Code in 1864 and the Civil Code in 1865. vAN EE, supra note 66,
at 50-51.
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in New York.68 The codes, however, had a great influence in the Western
United States, especially in California.69
North Dakota's statute barring prosecution, in the wake of a foreign
prosecution or acquittal, 70 traces its roots to Field's Code of Criminal
Procedure.71 The New York commissioners completed this code in
1850.72 Their goal had been to create a guide to criminal procedure that
could be understood by citizens and non-law-trained magistrates. 73 New
York did not adopt this code until 1881, but the Dakota Territory made
it law in 1869.74 Section 138 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provid-
ed that: "When an act charged as a public offence, is within the jurisdic-
tion of another state, country or territory, as well as of this state, a convic-
tion or acquittal thereof in the former, is a bar to a prosecution or
indictment therefor in this state." 75 North Dakota Century Code section
29-03-13 is identical to section 138, but for the substitution of the
modem spelling of "offense" and the use of the words "in this state"
instead of "of this state."76
Minnesota's "[f]oreign conviction or acquittal" statute77 can also
be traced to one of the Field commission's works: the Penal Code of
1865.78 The Penal Code was "reported complete" in 1865.79 It was
68. See Burke Corbet et al., Preface to ND. REv. CODES at iii, iv (1895) (discussing the legislative
history of the New York statutes). The first draft of the Code of Procedure was enacted in New York
in 1848. vAN EE, supra note 66, at 35. After much debate, the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure were enacted in 1881. Id. at 332. Field's great work, the Civil Code, was never enacted into
law in New York. Id. at 335.
69. Corbet et al., supra note 68, at iv-v (1895). Field's brother Stephen, later to become a justice
of the United States Supreme Court, moved to California in 1848 and became active in California's
law reform movement. Id. As a member of the legislature and of California's law reform commis-
sion, he was influential in the promulgation of a series of codes bearing great similarity to the New
York codes. Id.
70. N.D. CaTr. CODE § 29-03-13 (1991). See supra note 63 (setting out text of statute).
71. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (comparing North Dakota's statute with the
New York statute).
72. VAN EE, supra note 66, at 44.
73. Id. at 43.
74. Corbet et al., supra note 68, at iv-v.
75. CoMMIssioNERs ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, T HE CODE OF CRUMINAL P RocEDURE OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK § 138 (1850). Section 138 was not one of Field's innovations: it was derived from a pri-
or New York statute. Id. The base statute applied specifically to persons accused of killing others in
duels, and provided that:
Every person indicted under the provisions of the last section [on duels], may plead a
former conviction or acquittal for the same offence, in another state or country; and if
such plea be admitted or established, it shall be a bar to any further or other proceeding
against such person for the same offence within this state.
N.Y. REv. STAT. ch. I, tit. 1, § 7 (1846).
76. N.D. CENr. CODE § 29-03-13 (1991). See supra note 63 (setting forth text of statute).
77. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.045 (1987).
78. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (comparing the Minnesota statute with the New
York statute).
79. COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, THE PENAL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK (1865).
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based on extant statutes which were "systematized and harmonized." 80
The code was not adopted in New York until 1882.81 Minnesota adopt-
ed a Penal Code in 1885,82 and its code drafters drew heavily on the
work of the New York commissioners. The Minnesota drafters, however,
did not parrot the model code. For example, section 739 of the New
York Penal Code dealing with foreign convictions and acquittals provid-
ed:
But whenever it appears upon the trial of an indictment that the
accused has already been acquitted or convicted upon any
criminal prosecution under the laws of another state, govern-
ment or country, founded upon the act or omission in respect
to which he is upon trial, this is a sufficient defense.83
While Minnesota's code drafters retained this language in enacting their
own foreign conviction and acquittals statute, they also added language
that clarified the circumstances under which the statute would apply and
required that the prior conviction or acquittal be "on the merits."8 4
Thus, unlike North Dakota, Minnesota showed itself willing, from the
first, to depart from the original language of Field's codes.
The Field statutes on which the North Dakota and Minnesota
statutes were based were products of the age in which they were draft-
ed-the mid 1800s. The Federal Constitution's protection against dou-
ble jeopardy did not apply to the states during this period. 85 Thus, pro-
tection against multiple prosecution was granted state-by-state through
state constitutions and statutes. 86 Section 138 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and section 739 of the Penal Code were examples of state-
level statutory protections against multiple prosecution. Each dealt with
a narrow area of concern within the broad field of double jeopardy, and
each imposed specific protection. The statutes thus also reflect one of
80. VAN EE, supra note 66, at 50.
81. Corbet et al., supra note 68, at iv.
82. See 1885 Minn. Laws ch. 240 (providing for the separate publication of the penal code pass-
ed during the 1885 legislative session).
83. CONMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, THE PENAL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 739 (1865).
84. MiNN. STAT. § 6818 (1894). The statute provided:
Whenever it appears upon the trial of an indictment that the offense was committed in
another state or country, or under such circumstances that the courts of this state or gov-
ernment had jurisdiction thereof, and that the defendant has already been acquitted or
convicted on the merits upon a criminal prosecution under the laws of such state or coun-
try, founded upon the act or omission in respect to which he is upon trial, such former
acquittal or conviction is a sufficient defense.
Id.
85. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the 1969 extension of the constitution's
double jeopardy protection to the states).
86. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing state constitutional and statutory
protections against multiple prosecution).
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the underlying philosophies of the codification movement: the desire to
clarify the law through specific legislative enactments that allowed little
room for judicial interpretation. 87
Because these statutes were drafted so specifically, it is not difficult
to determine what sort of action they were promulgated to bar: succes-
sive prosecution based on an act for which the individual charged had
already been prosecuted in another jurisdiction.88 As such, these statutes
reflect the policy of the era in which they were drafted. Even though the
Supreme Court of the mid-1800s was ready to admit the constitutionality
of multiple prosecutions by different sovereigns, it was not inclined to
allow such prosecutions.89 No less an authority than Justice Story stated
that allowing separate sovereigns to twice punish an offender for the
same act would be contrary to "the principles of the common law, and
the genius of our free government." 90
North Dakota Century Code section 29-03-13 arguably reflects
Story's attitude. It was adopted by Dakota Territory in 186991 and was
based on a statute that was law more than a decade before the Supreme
Court articulated the dual sovereign doctrine. 92 It was absorbed into
87. See, e.g., JEREmy BENTHAM, THEORY OF L EISLATION 155-57 (R. Hildreth trans., 1911). Ben-
tham argued that when laws are written and literally followed, even if "difficult, obscure [or] incoher-
ent," citizens will at least have a chance to understand them. Id. at 155. On the other hand, Bentham
stated that when judges are allowed to freely interpret or make laws "there are no bounds to the pos-
sible evil" because the law can be changed from case to case. Id. at 155-56.
88. See CommissIoNEmS OF THE CODE, THE PENAL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 739 (1865),
Commissioners' Note, (stating that "[tihis section is intended to apply in cases where the foreign ac-
quittal or conviction took place in respect to the particular act or omission charged against the accused
upon the trial in this state, and is not restricted to cases where the accused was tried abroad under the
same charge").
89. See J. A. C. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1309, 1311
(1932) (stating that United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922), was the first case "in which the Su-
preme Court, faced with an actual instance of double prosecution, failed to find some remedy, consis-
tent with the law, to avoid it"); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878) (ordering state authorities to
release defendant who had been convicted of murder in state court in the wake of his conviction on
the same charge by a military tribunal; Justice Field indicated that the dual sovereign doctrine was not
implicated because the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the defendant).
90. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 72 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting). In Fox v. Ohio, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 410, 439 (1847) (McLean, J., dissenting), the case in which the Supreme Court opened
the door to the development of the dual sovereign doctrine, Justice McLean expressed agreement with
Story. He stated that:
There is no principle better established by the common law, none more fully recognized
in the federal and State constitutions, than that an individual shall not be put in jeopardy
twice for the same offence. This, it is true, applies to the respective governments; but its
spirit applies with equal force against a double punishment, for the same act, by a State
and the federal government.
Id.
91. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing Dakota Territory's adoption of the
Code of Criminal Procedure which contained the base version of the foreign conviction statute).
92. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the history of section 138 of Field's
Code of Criminal Procedure).
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North Dakota law at statehood 93 and has been little altered during the
state's history.94 Because the statute essentially has no North Dakota
legislative history, it seems reasonable to conclude that it continues to
reflect the venerable policy against dual sovereign prosecutions that
undergirded its model. Whether this policy remains the policy of North
Dakota is a question that likely will not be answered until section
29-03-13 is actually interpreted to bar a prosecution.95
The legislative history of Minnesota's foreign prosecution statute
has not been as uneventful as that of North Dakota's. The statute sur-
vived fundamentally unaltered from 1885 to 1963.96 In 1963, however,
the statute was repealed 97 and replaced by a new foreign prosecution
statute.98 This action was taken as part of Minnesota's criminal code re-
vision.99 The new statute, Minnesota Statutes Annotated section 609.045,
was a rewording of the previous statute and included language that expli-
citly broadened the application of the statute to federal court convictions
as well as those of other states or countries.100 The statute was apparently
routinely used to block state prosecutions that followed federal prosecu-
93. N.D. REV. CODE § 7868 (1895). Section 7868 is identical to North Dakota Century Code sec-
tion 29-03-13, the current statute. The Revised Code of 1895 was North Dakota's first code compila-
tion. Corbet et. al, supra note 68, at vi. Section 7868 of the 1895 code was an amended version of Da-
kota Code of Criminal Procedure section 82. ND. REV. CODE § 7868 (1895). The Dakota Code statute
provided: "When an act charged as a public offense is within the jurisdiction of another territory,
county, or state, as well as this territory, a conviction or acquittal thereof in the former, is a bar to a
prosecution or indictment therefor in this territory." DAKOTA CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 82 (1877).
94. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (tracing the history of North Dakota Century
Code section 29-03-13).
95. In the one reported case which mentions North Dakota Century Code section 29-03-13, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held the statute not to bar a drug delivery prosecution in North Dakota
that followed a Florida drug conspiracy conviction of the same defendant. State v. Mayer, 356
N.W.2d 149 (1984).
96. See M'N. STAT. § 610.23 (1947). This statute provided:
When, upon the trial of any person indicted for a crime, it appears that the offense was
committed in another state or country, under such circumstances that the courts of this
state had jurisdiction thereof, and that the defendant has already been acquitted or con-
victed on the merits, upon a criminal prosecution under the laws of such state or country,
founded upon the act or omission in respect of which he is upon trial, such former acquit-
tal or conviction is a sufficient defense.
Id.
97. 1963 Minn. Laws ch. 753, art. 2, § 17.
98. 1963 Minn. Laws ch. 753, art. 1, § 609.045. Before its 1983 amendment, this statute pro-
vided: "If an act or omission constitutes a crime under both the laws of this state and the laws of an-
other jurisdiction, a conviction or acquittal of such crime in the other jurisdiction bars prosecution for
the crime in this state." Id.
99. 1963 Minn. Laws ch. 753. See Maynard E. Pirsig, Proposed Revision of the Minnesota Crimi-
nal Code, 47 MINN. L. REv. 417 (detailing the policies that drove the criminal code revision).
100. MI. STAT. ANN. § 609.045 (1987) (amended by 1983 Minn. Laws ch. 152, § 1). The ad-
visory committee comment indicated that the revised statute was a rewording of Minnesota Statutes
section 610.23 "without change in substance," but for the addition of language that explicitly allowed
inclusion of federal court convictions. Id.
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tions based on the same acts. 10 1 Because of this fact, section 609.045 did
not linger in obscurity.O 2
Section 609.045 came before the Minnesota legislature for amend-
ment in 1983. Representative Coleman, sponsor of the amendment,
pushed for the addition of new language to Section 609.045 providing
that conviction or acquittal in other jurisdictions would not bar a Minne-
sota prosecution unless "the elements of both law and fact are identi-
cal." 103 Coleman indicated that the new test was intended to mirror the
Blockburger test.10 4 Testifying in support of the amendment, Melinda
Elledge, an assistant county attorney for Ramsey County, stated that an
amended statute would still protect defendants. 105 She indicated, by way
of example, that the redrafted statute would protect bank robbers from
being prosecuted under fundamentally similar state and federal bank
robbery statutes. 106 On the other hand, Representative Coleman stated
that an amended statute would protect "citizens" when criminals com-
mit different federal and state offenses in a "single behavioral incident"
by allowing both state and federal prosecutions.107
Elledge cited State v. Ming Sen ShiuelO8 as an example of an
instance where section 609.045 had barred a state prosecution.109 In that
case, Ming Sen Shiue kidnapped a woman and her daughter in May
1980 and held them prisoner for seven weeks.110 He was convicted on
101. See Tape of Hearing on H.F. 530 Before the Subcomm. on Judicial Administration of the
Minnesota House Comm. on the Judiciary (March 16, 1983) (on file with Minnesota House Librarian)
[hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Melinda S. Elledge, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney) (detailing
several instances in which state prosecutions were barred because the defendant had been previously
tried in federal court).
102. See infra notes 103-115 and accompanying text (discussing the 1983 amendment of Minne-
sota Statutes section 609.045).
103. Hearing, supra note 101 (statement of Rep. Coleman).
104. Id. Rep. Coleman indicated that Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), was the
leading dual sovereign doctrine case, and that it barred prosecutions by different sovereigns in cases
in which the "law and fact" at issue are identical. Id. Application of the Blockburger test, in reality,
will not bar a dual sovereign prosecution: two offenses cannot have the same elements when they are
offenses against different sovereigns. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text (explaining the
Blockburger test and the dual sovereign exception). Minnesota courts had, however, long applied a
"Blockburger-like" test to all double jeopardy matters at the time the amendment to section 609.045
was considered. See infra notes 147-152 and accompanying text (discussing Minnesota's approach to
double jeopardy issues). The judicial Blockburger-like test was phrased in the same terms used by the
amendment to section 609.045. See Lupino v. State, 171 N.W.2d 710, 711 (Minn. 1969) (laying out the
test).
105. Hearing, supra note 101 (testimony of Melinda Elledge).
106. Id.
107. Id. (statement of Rep. Coleman). Elledge testified that the unamended statute gave defend-
ants an incentive to rush into federal court so that they could claim a bar to state prosecution, and
urged passage so that this incentive could be removed. Id. (testimony of Melinda Elledge).
108. 326 N.W.2d 648, 649-50 (Minn. 1982).
109. Hearing, supra note 101 (testimony of Melinda Elledge).
110. State v. Ming Sen Shiue, 326 N.W.2d 648, 649-50 (Minn. 1982). Shine kidnapped Mary
Stauffer and her daughter Elizabeth on May 16, 1980, and held them prisoner in his St. Paul apartment
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federal kidnapping charges, and the state was thus barred from prosecut-
ing him for rape and assault charges that arose out of the same course of
conduct.IIl With this notorious case in the background,"l 2 and with
broad support from the law enforcement community,11 3 the amendment
to section 609.045 moved through the Minnesota House and Senate with
little debate.'1 4 The amended statute became law August 1, 1983.115
The Minnesota and North Dakota foreign convictions statutes
overall have similar roots but have grown in quite different ways. The
North Dakota statute's language has imposed, since its inception, an
affirmative bar against dual sovereign prosecutions.1' 6 It thus reflects a
very old and possibly obsolete legal philosophy, one that viewed such
prosecutions as clearly wrong.117 The Minnesota statute, however, has
been altered to provide only a conditional bar to dual sovereign prosecu-
tions.118 It probably reflects a more "modem" attitude because it frees
prosecutors to be "tough on crime."'119 The next section of this study
will examine what guidance can be gleaned from the courts as to how
these fundamentally different statutes should be interpreted.
until they escaped on July 7, 1980. Id. Shiue also killed six-year-old Jason Wilkman, who witnessed
the abduction. Id. Shiue was tried on state charges for the Wilkman killing, was convicted of second
degree murder, and was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Id. at 649.
111. Hearing, supra note 101 (testimony of Melinda Elledge). Shiue was charged in federal
court with kidnapping and interstate transportation. United States v. Ming Sen Shine, 650 F.2d 919, 920
(8th Cir. 1981). He was found guilty on these charges and sentenced to life in prison. Regional News,
UPI, Mar. 18, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
112. In a UPI poll of subscribers and broadcasters, the Ming Sen Shuie kidnapping case was
named the number three Minnesota news story of 1980. Richard McFarland, Minnesota Year in Re-
view-Top Ten, UPI, Dec. 29, 1980, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
113. Hearing, supra note 101 (testimony of Melinda Elledge). The Minnesota State Sheriff's As-
sociation, the Minnesota County Attorney's Association, the Minnesota Attorney General's Office,
and the Crime Victim/Witness Programs of Minneapolis and St. Paul supported the amendment. Id.
Sheriff Chuck Zacharias testified that it was difficult to explain to victims why state prosecution of a
defendant was barred in certain cases, and indicated that if the amendment was passed, it would give
victims some satisfaction because they would know that justice was really being served. Hearing,
supra note 101 (testimony of Chuck Zacharias).
114. See Minutes of Hearing on H.F. 530 Before the Subcomm. on Judicial Administration of the
Minnesota House Comm. on the Judiciary (March 16,1983); Minutes of Hearing on H.F. 530 Before
the Minnesota House Comm. on the Judiciary (March 21, 1983); Minutes of Hearing on S.F. 549
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Minnesota Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (March 25,
1983); Minutes of Hearing on S.F. 549 Before the Minnesota Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (March
29, 1983) (indicating that all committees forwarded the amended statute with little debate).
115. 1983 Minn. Laws ch. 152, § 1.
116. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (detailing the history of the North Dakota for-
eign conviction statute).
117. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (discussing the legal philosophy underlying
the North Dakota statute).
118. See supra notes 103-115 and accompanying text (discussing the amendment of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.045).
119. See supra note 113 (discussing support for the amended statute within the law enforcement
community).
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IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Minnesota Statutes Annotated section 609.045 and North Dakota
Century Code section 29-03-13 have long histories.120 Neither, however,
has been much discussed by Minnesota nor North Dakota courts, and
only two reported opinions deal specifically with these statutes. 12 1 For-
tunately, the extant opinions provide significant insight into how the stat-
utes should be construed. 122
The North Dakota Supreme Court faced the question of whether
section 29-03-13 could be used to bar a state prosecution in State v.
Mayer.123 The defendant in Mayer had pled guilty in Florida to conspir-
acy to distribute drugs.124 He was charged with possession and delivery
of the same drugs in North Dakota.125 He argued that section 29-03-13
should bar the North Dakota prosecution because both the North Dakota
charges and the Florida conviction were based on the same acts. 126
Justice VandeWalle, expressing the unanimous opinion of the North
Dakota Supreme Court, found that section 29-03-13 did not bar the sec-
ond prosecution.127 He stated that delivery and distribution of drugs in
North Dakota were "not acts 'within the jurisdiction of another state"'
as required by the statute. 128 Furthermore, he found that conspiracy was
"not the same act as delivery . .. or possession" of drugs. 129
The statutory reading of the Mayer court may be characterized as
restrictive. In finding that delivery and possession of the drugs were not
included in the act of conspiring to deliver the drugs, the court in Mayer
seemed to read "act" as a very specific event. Contrast this with the
preamendment interpretation of the Minnesota statute: Representative
120. See supra part M (discussing the histories of the North Dakota and Minnesota statutes).
121. See State v. Aune, 363 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. 1985) (applying section 609.045); State v. May-
er, 356 N.W.2d 149 (N.D. 1984) (applying section 29-03-13).
122. See infra part IV (discussing the judicial interpretation of the North Dakota and Minnesota
statutes).
123. 356 N.W.2d 149 (N.D. 1984).
124. State v. Mayer, 356 N.W.2d 149, 151 (N.D. 1984). Mayer pled guilty to "conspiracy to pos-
sess, deliver, or sell in excess of 100 pounds of marijuana." Id. The marijuana that the conspiracy
charge was based on was marijuana that police seized from Mayer in North Dakota. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. At his North Dakota trial, Mayer was found guilty of possession and delivery of mari-
juana. Id. at 150. He raised the issue of statutory bar on appeal. Id. Mayer had initially also been
charged with conspiracy under North Dakota law. Id. at 151. These charges were dismissed. Id.
127. Id. at 151-52.
128. Id. at 151.
129. Mayer, 356 N.W.2d at 151. VandeWalle stated that "[c]onspiracy... consists only of an a-
greement to engage in or cause conduct constituting an offense, together with an overt act, which
need not itself be a crime." Id. He then observed that the acts for which Mayer was charged in North
Dakota were offenses that required actual possession and distribution of drugs. Id. at 152. He indi-
cated that it would be "illogical" to find that a conviction for conspiracy to commit an act barred pros-
ecution for commission of the act itself. Id.
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Coleman construed the "act" language contained in the Minnesota
statute as meaning a "single behavioral incident." 130 , Relying on this
reading, she asserted that a convicted felon who robbed a grocery store
using a firearm, and then rushed to federal court to plead guilty to being
a con-victed felon in possession of a firearm, would escape a robbery
prosecution in Minnesota based on the statute. 131 Under the rationale of
Mayer, the North Dakota Supreme Court would likely determine that the
act of possessing the firearm and the act of robbing the store were
different acts and there would therefore be no bar to a second prosecu-
tion under section 29-03-13. The North Dakota Supreme Court thus
may have already dealt with the "evil" that seems to have inspired
Minnesota's amendment of its statute: an expansive reading of the term
"act."
Justice VandeWalle's characterization in Mayer of the jurisdiction
language in section 29-03-13 also could limit the use of the statute to
bar second prosecutions. For example, Minnesota prosecutors in the
Ming Sen Shiue case apparently determined that they were barred from
prosecuting Ming Sen Shiue on rape charges because the rapes took
place during a kidnapping for which he had already been prosecuted by
the federal government.132 Under the reasoning of the Mayer court, at
least some of the rapes could be characterized as acts not within the
jurisdiction of another sovereign because they were distinct crimes,
occurring wholly within the jurisdiction of the state. 133 Therefore, sec-
tion 29-03-13 would not apply to those acts.134 In a factual scenario like
the Ming Sen Shiue case, a North Dakota rape prosecution could likely
go forward.
The Mayer case provides significant insight as to how section 29-
03-13 should be interpreted. Because the case involved a prior state pro-
secution, however, the question of whether section 29-03-13 applies to
prior federal prosecutions was not addressed by the court. The question
130. Hearing, supra note 101 (statement of Rep. Coleman).
131. Id.
132. Hearing, supra note 101 (statement of Melinda Elledge).
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994) (proscribing interstate abduction and kidnapping, but not rape).
In 1980, when Ming Sen Shiue's crimes took place, rape was a federal offense only "within the spe-
cial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1976) (repealed
1986). Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction includes certain vessels on the high seas and Great
Lakes, land reserved for the use of the United States (such as military reservations), and certain air-
craft and spacecraft. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1994). None of Ming Sen Shiue's crimes took place within the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See supra notes 110 and accompany-
ing text (detailing Ming Sen Shiue's crimes). The federal rape statutes were repealed in 1986. See
Act of Nov. 10, 1986, P.L. 99-646, 87(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3623; Act of Nov. 14, 1986, P.L. 99-654, 3(a)
(1), 100 Stat. 3663.
134. See State v. Mayer, 356 N.W.2d 149, 151 (N.D. 1984) (indicating that if an act is not within
the jurisdiction of another sovereign, the statute does not bar prosecution for the act).
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is important because it is more likely that overlapping jurisdiction will be
a problem between federal and state governments than between the
governments of two states. 135 Minnesota's section 609.045 allows a
prior federal prosecution to bar a subsequent state prosecution.136 The
language of North Dakota's section 29-03-13 does not explicitly state
that a prior federal prosecution would be a bar: it provides only that a
second prosecution may be barred after a prior prosecution in "another
state, country, or territory."137
Courts in two states with statutes similar to North Dakota's, however,
have found that this language is broad enough to include federal prose-
cutions. In New York, the Court of Appeals held that its statute's "an-
other state, territory or country" language was "a general reference to
sovereigns other than New York" and not a deliberate exclusion of the
federal government.138 The Indiana Supreme Court came to a similar
conclusion in construing identical language in its statute. 139 Both courts
relied on essentially the same rationale, reasoning that it would be im-
proper to construe the language narrowly because such a construction
would defeat the purpose of the statute as a whole.140 Based on this
reasoning, it could be argued that section 29-03-13 of the North Dakota
135. See supra notes 101-115 (discussing Minnesota's amendment of Minnesota Statutes section
609.045 in response to bars imposed due to prior federal prosecutions). If a person commits an act
that simultaneously violates state and federal law, the state may take jurisdiction over the person be-
cause the act was committed within its borders and the federal government may take jurisdiction
because the act was also committed within its borders. Before two states can take jurisdiction over a
person, however, the person generally has to have extended her criminal conduct beyond the borders
of a state. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (involving a person whose criminal con-
duct was under the jurisdiction of two states).
136. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.045 (1987) (Advisory Committee Comment).
137. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-03-13 (1991).
138. People v. Lo Cicero, 200 N.E.2d 622, 623-24 (N.Y. 1964). Lo Cicero involved a defendant
who had been acquitted in federal court on charges of "obstructing by robbery the movement of goods
in interstate commerce." Id. at 623. The New York Court of Appeals held that prosecution of the de-
fendant on robbery charges in state court was therefore barred under New York Code of Criminal
Procedure section 139. Id. at 624. Section 139 was fundamentally identical to North Dakota Century
Code section 29-03-13. Compare id. at 623 (providing text of section 139 of the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure) with supra note 63 (setting forth text of section 29-03-13 of the North Dakota
Century Code).
139. Wilson v. State, 383 NE.2d 304 305-06 (Ind. 1978). The defendant in Wilson pled guilty to
federal armed robbery and assault charges. Id. at 305. The Indiana Supreme Court ruled that Wil-
son's prosecution on state charges was thereby barred under Indiana Code section 35-1-2-15. Id. at
306. Indiana Code section 35-1-2-15 was fundamentally identical to North Dakota Century Code sec-
tion 29-03-13. Compare id. at 305 (providing text of section 35-1-2-15 of the Indiana Code) with supra
note 63 (setting forth text of section 29-03-13 of the North Dakota Century Code). Indiana Code sec-
tion 35-1-2-15 was subsequently amended. Wilson, 383 N.E.2d at 305.
140. See Lo Cicero, 200 NE.2d at 624 (stating that "in view of the fundamental character of the
rule that a man shall not be twice vexed for the same cause and the deep roots it throws into the history
of the criminal law, we are not inclined to narrow its application by exceptions based on an ambiguity
of statutory draftmanship"); Wilson, 383 N.E.2d at 306 (stating that "the purpose of this statute was to
extend the constitutional double jeopardy provision to include [all] 'dual sovereigns' .... To leave out
the federal government would defeat the purpose of extended protection").
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Century Code should also apply to prior prosecutions. by the federal
government as well as those involving "another state, territory or
country."
The Minnesota Supreme Court assessed the applicability and
interpretation of its foreign conviction statute in State v. Aune. 14 1 The
defendant in Aune pled guilty in federal court to conspiring to deal in
firearms without a license. 142 He was also charged in state court with a
number of charges based on the same acts underlying the federal charge,
including selling stolen goods and selling firearms without a license. 143
Aune argued that section 609.045 barred the state prosecution.144 In
making this argument, he relied on the unamended version of section
609.045, which had been in force at the time of his trial. 145 Justice
Simonett, writing for a unanimous court, found that section 609.045 did
not bar Aune from being tried on state charges because it "envisions a
Blockburger-type standard." 146
Justice Simonett based this conclusion on five grounds.147 First, he
looked to the result in State v. Lupino,148 in which the Minnesota Su-
preme Court affirmed the denial of a postconviction relief petition. 149
The court in Lupino indicated that a defendant was protected from
successive prosecution only when the second prosecution was for the
identical act and the second crime charged was identical "[b]oth in law
and fact" to the first.150 Even though the court in Lupino did not
consider section 609.045, Justice Simonett in Aune indicated that the
statute would have required the same result. 151 Essentially, Justice
Simonett seemed to suggest that Lupino demonstrated a policy to apply
the Blockburger rationale in all Minnesota double jeopardy questions.152
141. 363 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. 1985).
142. State v. Aune, 363 N.W.2d 741,742 (Minn. 1985).
143. Id. at 742-44.
144. Id. at 742.
145. Id. at 745. See supra note 98 (giving text of the unamended statute).
146. Aune, 363 N.W.2d at 746.
147. Id. (laying out the grounds for the rejection of Aune's argument).
148. 171 N.W.2d 710 (Minn. 1969).
149. Aune, 363 N.W.2d at 746 (citing State v. Lupino, 171 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. 1969)). In
State v. Lupino, the defendant had been convicted on federal flight from prosecution charges and on
state kidnapping charges. 171 N.W.2d at 711. The acts on which the charges had been based were
all within the same course of conduct. Id. In rejecting the petition, the Lupino court did not directly
consider the foreign conviction statute then in force, Minnesota Statutes section 610.23. See id. See
also supra note 96 (giving the text of section 610.23 of the Minnesota Statutes).
150. Lupino, 171 N.W.2d at 711 (quoting State v. Fredlund, 273 N.W. 353, 355 (Minn. 1937).
151. Aune, 363 N.W.2d at 746.
152. Id. Before analyzing Lupino, Justice Simonett reviewed bars to successive prosecutions
across the country. Id. at 745. In analyzing states which did not apply a "Blockburger-type" test, he
focused on the broadness of their statutes as compared to Minnesota. Id. (citing Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)). He implied, at least, that states applying the Blockburger test to foreign
prosecutions were in the majority. Id. After his analysis of Lupino, Justice Simonett concluded that the
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Justice Simonett next looked to how courts in other jurisdictions
had construed statutes "not as clear" as section 609.045.153 In particu-
lar, he looked to cases from Arizona and California. 154 Both these states
had statutes similar to Minnesota Statutes section 610.23,155 which was
the immediate predecessor of section 609.045 and was repealed in 1963
when section 609.045 was put in place.156 In the first case noted by the
Minnesota Supreme Court, State v. Poland,157 the Arizona Supreme
Court found that its statute did not block the murder prosecution of a
defendant who had been prosecuted in federal court for a kidnapping
and armed robbery that were part of the course of conduct that led to the
murder. 158 The court in Poland reasoned that the state and federal
prosecutions were not parallel because they "were for distinct and sep-
arate crimes occurring at different times." 159 In the next example cited
by Justice Simonett, People v. Belcher, 160 the California Supreme Court
indicated that its statute barred a second prosecution only when "all the
acts constituting the offense in this state were necessary to prove the
offense in the prior prosecution."161 Justice Simonett concluded that
the courts in Poland and Belcher applied "Blockburger-type" standards
and that this supported application of similar standards in Minnesota. 162
Justice Simonett then looked to the statute's language.1 63 He
indicated that the legislature could write statutes capable of broad
Minnesota statute was "sufficiently clear" in requiring application of a "Blockburger-type standard."
Id. at 746.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra note 96 (giving text of section 610.23).
156. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing the repeal of Minnesota Statutes
section 610.23 and the Minnesota criminal code revision).
157. 645 P.2d 784 (Ariz. 1982).
158. State v. Poland, 645 P.2d 784, 791 (Ariz. 1982). The Arizona statute provided that:
When on the trial of an accused person it appears that upon a criminal prosecution under
the laws of the United States, or of another state or country, founded upon the act or
omission in respect to which he is on trial he has been acquitted or convicted, it is a
sufficient defense.
ARIz. REv. STAT. 13-146 (transferred and renumbered as ARiz. Rav. STAT. 13-112 by Ariz. Sess.
Laws 1977, ch. 142) (repealed by Ariz. Sess. Laws 1982, ch. 238).
159. Poland, 645 P.2d at 791.
160. 520 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1974).
161. People v. Belcher, 520 P.2d 385, 390-91 (Cal. 1974). The California statute provides that
"[w]henever on the trial of an accused person it appears that upon a criminal prosecution under the
laws of another State, Government, or country, founded upon the act or omission in respect to which
he is on trial, he has been acquitted or convicted, it is a sufficient defense." CAL. PENAL CODE § 656
(West 1994).
162. State v. Anne, 363 N.W.2d 741, 746 (Minn. 1985).
163. Id.
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interpretation. 164 He suggested that if the legislature had wanted the
courts to interpret section 609.045 to require application of something
other than the Blockburger test, it would have written the statute in a
different way.1 65 In making this analysis, however, Justice Simonett did
not look specifically at the language of 609.045 itself. He nonetheless
concluded that because the statute's language was not as broad as other
double jeopardy and successive prosecution statutes, it did not support a
broad interpretation. 166
Justice Simonett concluded by examining the legislature's amend-
ment of section 609.045.167 He indicated that the court believed the
amendment to be a clarification of the statute, rather than a substantive
change.168 He thus read the language of the amendment, which provid-
ed that there would be no bar to a second prosecution "unless the
elements of law and fact are identical,"169 to support the court's position
that the unamended statute should be interpreted as requiring application
164. Id. In particular, he referred to Minnesota Statutes section 609.035 which then provided
that:
Except as provided in Section 609.585, if a person's conduct constitutes more than one
offense under the laws of this state he may be punished for only one of such offenses
and a conviction or acquittal of any of them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them.
All such offenses may be included in one prosecution which shall be stated in separate
counts.
Id. at 746 n.5. (quoting Minnesota Statutes section 609.035 as it appeared in 1982).
165. Id. at 746. He indicated that if the legislature wanted a statute that could be broadly applied,
it could have written a statute with language similar to section 609.035. Id. See supra note 164 (giving
language of 609.035). He further observed that if the legislature had wanted a statute amenable to an
intermediate interpretation, it had available to it the Model Penal Code formulation. Aune, 363 N.W.2d
at 746. The model code provides:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this
State and of the United States or another State, a prosecution in any such other juris-
diction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this State under the following circum-
stances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as
defined in Section 1.08 and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same
conduct, unless (a) the offense of which the defendant was formerly con-
victed or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted
each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining
each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm
or evil or (b) the second offense was not consummated when the former
trial began; or
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the information
was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by a final order or
judgment for the defendant that has not been set aside, reversed or vacated
and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a deter-
mination inconsistent with a fact that must be established for conviction of
the offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10 (1962).
166. Aune, 363 N.W.2d at 746.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing Minnesota Statutes section 609.045).
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of the Blockburger test. 170 He indicated that the fact the new statutory
language was identical to the language in Lupino further supported this
interpretation. 171
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Aune was unequivocal in sup-
porting the application of the Blockburger test under section 609.045.172
The history of the amended statute indicates that the legislature intended
the statute to require application of the Blockburger standard.173 It is not
so clear, however, that the language of the unamended statute supported
such an interpretation. The unamended statute was read by prosecutors
as a broad bar to successive prosecutions, and the legislature passed the
amendment based on arguments that it was necessary to narrow the
scope of the statute. 174 The court's interpretation, in Aune, of unamend-
ed section 609.045 thus was contrary to that of the prosecutors and the
legislature. Since the legislature had so clearly and recently expressed its
support for a narrow interpretation of section 609.045, it is possible that
the court in Aune had no other option but to conclude that the un-
amended statute should be interpreted to express this policy. If this is so,
it may explain why the court made little effort to analyze the language
of the statute itself.
The extant case law on the North Dakota and Minnesota statutes,
even though sparse, gives significant insight into the scope of the stat-
utes. In North Dakota, the supreme court has shown that it will interpret
the term "act" from section 29-03-13 narrowly. 175 If a second prose-
cution is to be barred, the first prosecution must have been based on the
identical, discrete act rather than the same course of action. 176 In Minne-
sota, the rule is even narrower: a second prosecution is only barred if the
offense charged is identical to the offense tried in the initial prosecu-
tion. 177 The Minnesota rule, however, may be broader than the North
Dakota rule in one respect: it is possible that a Minnesota prosecution
may be barred after a federal prosecution for the same offense.178 In
North Dakota, it is not completely clear whether this would be the
170. Id.
171. Aune, 363 N.W.2d at 746.
172. See supra notes 146-171 and accompanying text (discussing the Aune court's analysis of
whether the Blockburger standard should apply under Minnesota Statutes section 609.045).
173. See supra notes 101-115 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the 1983 amend-
ment to Minnesota Statutes section 609.045).
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 123-134 and accompanying text (discussing the North Dakota Supreme
Court's interpretation of section 29-03-13 of the North Dakota Century Code in State v. Mayer, 356
N.W.2d 149 (N.D. 1984)).
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 141-171 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota Supreme Court's
interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.045 in State v. Aune, 363 N.W.2d 741 (1985)).
178. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.045 (Advisory Committee Comment).
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case. 179 Overall, while the language of the Minnesota and North Dakota
statutes is different, it is likely that both would be interpreted similarly:
neither would seem to bar a second prosecution unless the act at its base
was fundamentally identical to the act that formed the basis of the first
prosecution.
V. CONCLUSION
While the laws of Minnesota and North Dakota provide a barrier to
dual sovereign prosecutions, this barrier is not impermeable. In Minne-
sota, the legislature created a statute designed to bar only limited types of
prosecutions, and the courts have interpreted the statute in line with
legislative intent. 180 In North Dakota, the legislature has been silent for
more than a century as to state policy regarding dual sovereign prosecu-
tions.181 North Dakota courts, guided only by the language of the stat-
ute itself, have found the state's bar against dual sovereign prosecutions
to be a narrow one. 182 Thus, in both Minnesota and North Dakota, the
statutory barrier to dual sovereign prosecutions may be more symbolic
than real: it will probably not be applied to stop a second prosecution
except in the most egregious of cases.
179. See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying text (considering whether section 29-03-13
would bar a state prosecution subsequent to a federal prosecution).
180. See supra notes 103-115, 141-171 and accompanying text (discussing, respectively, the leg-
islative history and judicial interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.045).
181. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of section
29-03-13 of the North Dakota Century Code).
182. See supra notes 123-134 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial interpretation of
section 29-03-13 of the North Dakota Century Code).
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